A.  Introduction:

     In the galaxy of heroes of the American Revolutionary War who are paraded in front of us on a regular basis one who appears to be forgotten, or at least given little recognition, is General Nathaniel Greene.

    A strong argument can be made that General Greene was the best strategist in the American Revolution.  We are not speaking of tactics, the "battle day" operations, but of the overall operation of the campaign he was involved in.

     While General Washington eventually became a reasonably effective guerilla commander, he generally reacted to the movements of the opposing commanders.  Only in the "New Jersey" campaign involving Trenton and Princeton did he show any real initiative, and it can be stated that this was forced on him to save his army.  Greene, on the other hand, continually forced the issue and caused the British to REACT TO HIM.

B.  Definitions:

     Several points must be explained for the reader to understand the concepts we are dealing with.

           STRATEGY:  Strategy deals with the overall use of the resources available to you to, understanding their strengths, limitations and capabilities and utilizing them to your best advantage.  It also deals with an understanding of these same traits in the enemy and utilizing your strengths against his weaknesses, to include an understanding of the opposing commanders.  This encompasses psychology, best use of personnel, use of intelligence, understanding your personnel, and the commander keeping his eyes set on the overall mission given to him.

        OPERATIONAL CYCLE:  This is the time frame from identification of the problem/situation to actual troop activity; whether combat operations, movement, etc.  Every military force has a set sequence of events and actions, "indicators," which identify its movements.  If you, as the opposing commander, can move faster than that cycle you force the enemy to move to your actions.  You literally move faster than the enemy can think and react.

          TACTICS:  Tactics deal with the actual operational activities used in directly leading up to, during, and after an engagement.  The direct deployment of men, material, and equipment; use of terrain and immediate ("Real Time") intelligence on the disposition of the enemy forces going into combat.

C.  The Situation:

     Arriving at his new headquarters shortly after the disastrous battle of Camden, South Carolina, General Greene inherited the remnants of the Army of the South, approximately 800 ill equipped, poorly supplied soldiers with extremely low morale.  It would have not been surprising if General Greene had resigned himself to defeat at that time, but he did not.  Greene's experience as a brigade commander, quartermaster general, and operational officer under General Washington proved invaluable.  It was said that within 48 hours of taking command he, "Understood the supply problems of the army of the South better than General Gates had during his entire command tour."

D.  Leadership:

     At this point General Greene could have been excused if he questioned the abilities of his subordinate commanders.  However he recognized strength where others would have overlooked it.  One of his artillery commanders had smashed a British assault at Mommouth,  he understood the abilities of the continental line units assigned to him and the ability of their commanders, Colonels Kirkland and Smallwood, of the Delaware and Maryland line.  He also understood the uses and abilities of the guerilla fighters operating within his theater.

     Where General Gates brushed off men like Francis Marion and Alan Pickens, Greene embraced them as both a means of keeping the British off balance and of gathering information.  He understood that their knowledge of the country and people, as well as their hit and run tactics, could serve his purpose.

     Finally, as is sometimes the case in war, timing and luck came to bear.  Immediately after his arrival Major General Daniel Morgan, the illiterate giant, who was a tactical genius, came out of retirement to, as Morgan an old wagoneer said, "Crack the whip once more."  The final piece of Greene's command structure came into place when Colonel Wilbur Washington, nephew of the General, arrived with 300 well equipped, fully trained and well mounted dragoons (heavy cavalry).

     General Greene, understanding the abilities of his subordinates allowed the tough, proud, head strong but reliable Morgan as much latitude as the situation allowed.  Additionally, understanding the capabilities of Colonel Washington and his troops, General Greene placed them on detached service with Colonel Marions guerillas where the additional combat strength, speed, and shock action of these trained troops would enhance the raiding ability of  Marions and Pickens units.

     General Greene's continued displays of trust and confidence in his subordinate commanders at a time when their abilities could have been questioned instilled them with trust and loyalty in this new commander.  Additionally, his concern for the well being of his troops and continued attempts at improving their supply situation instilled the common soldier with trust in their commander and rebuilt morale.  Critical elements for the success of an army.

D.  Greene as Strategist:

    In the realm of the strategist, that individual who must plan and coordinate an entire campaign, Greene was without equal in the American Revolution.  The best argument in support of this statement is that he was successful.  Beginning with the remnants of a shattered army whose previous commander (Gen. Gates) was sacked for incompetence and whose best commander (Baron De Kalb) was dead, General Greene was given the job of defeating a large and victorious British Army as well as liberating three colonies - and he did it.

     From the start of his command tour Greene displayed the traits that mark the outstanding commander, audacity and foresight.  General Greene sent word to Marion and Pickens that they would work in concert; the guerilla's would keep Greene abreast of the movements of the British as well as keeping them off balance forcing the British to expend energy attempting to stop them while he (Greene) would present enough of a threat to keep the British from turning all their forces against the guerillas.  As a show of faith, and best use of his personnel, General Greene assigned Washington's unit to the guerillas as mentioned.  Finally, in what would initially appear as madness, Greene SPLIT HIS OWN SMALL FORCE giving command of approximately half of it to General Morgan.  However General Greene understood that if he kept his force intact the British could throw a ring around him and prevent any action.  If he trusted his commanders and ensured his own operational freedom the British would possibly split their own forces and send an element after himself or Morgan that they could defeat.  It was a new concept in the strategy of the War in the South:  a coordinated operation under the overall command of one man with subordinates given maximum latitude to function in a tactical sense while accomplishing the overall objectives of the campaign.

     The key element of psychology was well played by General Greene during the six month campaign.  If appears from all evidence that Nathaniel Greene had an excellent insight into the minds of his opponents.  The British, having disposed of the American units at Charleston, Savannah, and Camden, had little regard for the abilities of the colonial army, or its leaders.  Greene's understanding of this allowed him to move his units into positions which gave their battle field commanders the best opportunity for success.  The success of General Morgan at the Battle of the Cowpens was an excellent example of his strategy.  Morgan's force was pursued by a force of approximately 1100 men under the commander of Colonel Bannister Tarleton (aka "The Butcher") who caught up with Morgan, or more accurately was allowed to catch-up to Morgan, at the site of the Battle of the Cowpens.

     The battle, called the best planned and executed battle of the War, was a tribute to the strategy laid out by Greene:

          - The split in his forces encouraged the British to send a unit of comparable size against Morgan; one he was capable of defeating.

         - The cooperation between the "regulars" and the guerillas enabled Greene and Morgan to keep abreast of all movements of the British forces particularly enabling Morgan to select the time and place of combat AT HIS choosing.

          - The attachment of Washington's Dragoons to Marion allowed rapid movement of this unit to support Morgan during the battle.  This proved decisive as Washington's dragoons completed the envelopment of the British force at the Cowpens and Colonel Washington coming very close to killing Colonel Tarleton, the principal Tory Commander in the South.

     At no time did General Greene allow his entire force to be compromised for the sake of one victory.  In several instances, Guilford Court House for one,  one last charge could have won the day; but it also could have cost Greene his army if it failed and he would not risk it.  General Greene had the foresight to understand that the needs of the overall strategy outweighed the possibilities of one day.

     At the start of the race to the Dan River General Greene ordered every boat on the river to be siezed or distroyed, ensuring his safety and preventing a British blocking force from stopping him.  By forcing a rapid pace in the retreat he forced the British Commander to burn or leave all excess baggage and equipment behind.  This action depleted the British reserves of equipment needed to effectively crush the Colonial Army of the South.

   It must be stated that the strategy of General Greene had a darker side to it.  His use of the guerillas in conjunction with Colonel Washington and Greene's decision to allow his commanders as much latitude as possible resulted in the guerillas extracting vengence on all those who supported the British Crown.  In retaliation for atrocities, real or perceived, Marion and Washington decended on Tory formations and very often took no prisoners, leaving a wake of destruction in these formations akin to that wrecked by Tarleton himself.  While it did not necessiarly adhere to the rules of war this action had the very effective result of cooling off support for the British and reducing Tory enlistments to a trickle, further aggrevating the British personnel situation.

     In a campaign in which he was contiually on the move, where the best he ever did in battle was a draw Greene eventually bled the British to the point that the only areas they controlled were the ports under the protection of the guns of the British Navy.

     Greene's contiued adherence to the overall strategy of the campaign ensured the accomplishment of his mission and eventually lead to the British seeking support from their navy at a small Virigina port called Yorktown.